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The  Merger  Regulat"ion  which  was .adopted  by  "the  council  on 
21 'oecember. 1989,  created for  the first time  an  adec{u"ate 
legal  instrument. at community· level for "cohtrol' of mergers 
which  could affect trade across  the  boundaries  of  the  Member 
States •..  This' new  framework  of  Community 'merger control· is  ' 
widely  regard.ed  as  having  been· successfuL  It has  provided 
undertakings. 'which  a~e developing their businesses 'across 
the borders  of the  Member  States with  a  rap{d ·and  effic"ient 
system of merger  control  based  on  a  "one-stop"  shop  and  a 
lev.el  playing-field of  rules equally_ applied ·across  the 
community. 
The  Regulat;ion .establishes exclusive  Commission  competence 
for  the  assessment .of  concentrations  having 'a  Community 
dimerision ..  Thes.e'are  mergers,·  ~cquisition.s o"i  "s.trdctural" 
joint ventures  where  the  annual  turnover  of  the  ~nd~rtakings 
concerned exceed certain  thresho~ds.  Below  these  thresholds 
coricentr~tions are  only  subject to ~atiorial·merg~r  cbntr~l 
law if it exists. 
.  ,. 
~tter ri~arlj three years  of  applic~tion1 of  th~ Regulation 
it is  now  appropriate  for  the  Commission  to report 'to 
Council  an~ Parliament  on  s~ecific aspects  of its operation 
and effect{veness. 
In the fiist 'place there is  a  legal  obligat~~n·t~ conduct  a 
review  .. of  two  important  aspects  of  the Regulation2. 'These 
are  the turnover thresholds  under Article  1 ( 3)  and  cas·e 
ref~~ral to the  c~mpetent  ri~tional ~uthorities under  ~. 
Article 9(10).  The  former  is of  prime  importance  since it 
determines  the  scope  of  the  Commission's  exclusive 
competence;  the  latter is also of  major  importance  since  it 
establishes  th~  ci~c~mstances in which  cas~d which  are· 
notified to the  Commission  could nevertheless  be  dealt with 
by  national authorities. 
At  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  R~gulat1on;. ·a  m..inib~r· of 
specific policy declarations concerning  future  changes  to 
the  Regulation  were  made: 
The  Commission  itself stated that:· 
:.  .  '  . 
the main  (i.e. world)  turnover  threshold  should  be  reduced 
~~om 5,o6o  to  2,000  million-~cu at the  eri~ of  the·  initi~l 
stage of  implementation  and that the  community··ti.irnover· 
threshold of  250  million  ECU  should  also  be  revised in the 
light of  experience  and  the  trend of  the  main  threshold. 
If the  same  proportionate  reduction  is  made  as  for  the 
main  threshold,  this  implies  a  threshold of  100  million 
ECU  instead of  250  million  ECU; 
Furthermore,  the  CommiHnion  and  til•?  cuuncil  tuyether  stated 
t.hat: 
1  The  Regulation  entered into force  on  21  September  1990 
2  There  is also  an  implicit  review  for  referral of  concen-
trations of  non-Comunity  dimension  by  Member  states to  the 
commission  implied  under Article  22(6) - 2  -
- they were  ready to consider  taking  other  factors  into 
account  in addition to turnover  when  the  thresholds  were 
revised; 
threshold review should  be  combined  with  a  special re-
examination of  the method  of  calculation of  the  turnover 
of  joint undertakings  for  the  application of Article  5(5}; 
- a  more  precise concept of  banking  income  should  be  applied 
either,  subsequent to the entry into force  of the  relevant 
provisions of Directive  86/635  or,  at the time of 
threshold review;  and 
the  arrangements  for  the  publication of  opinions  of  the 
Advisory  Committee  should  be  reviewed. 
The  first  two  declarations  concern Article  1  of  the  Regu-
lation whilst the third declaration  bears  on  Article  5(5}. 
The  last two relate to Article  5(3)a  and Article  19(7} 
respectively. 
Within  the  framework  provided  by  the  above  considerations 
the  present paper 
- presents  a  summary  on  the  implementation of  the  Regulation 
to date, 
conducts  an  examination  of  specific provisions of  the 
Regulation  (including of  turnover  thresholds  and  Article  9 
referral which  is legally required)  and  examines  the  case 
for  the  scope  for  improvements,  with  and without 
amendments  of  the  Regulation,  and  assesses  the  possibility 
of  solving problems  within  the  framework  of  the existing 
Regulation. 
- proposes  that the  Commission  should postpone  any  formal 
proposal to revise  the  Regulation until,  at the  latest, 
the  end of  1996. 
II.  PROGRESS  ON  IMPLEMENTATION 
A.  SUMMARY  OF  DECISIONS 
Decisions  under Articles  6(1)  and  8 
1.  As  of  30th June  1993,  165  operations  had  been  notified under 
the  Merger  Regulation  and  there  have  been  159  Article  6(1) 
decisions: Number  of 
cases 
Article  17 
6 ( l) a  (out-
side  scope 
cif  Regulation) 
Article 6(1)b 
(compatible 
with  common 
market) 
Article 6(1)c 
(initiating 
proceedings) 
131 
11 
159 
- 3  -
% of 
% of  cases  falling 
all cases  notified under  Regulation 
11 
82  92 
7  8 
100  100 
As  can  be  seen,  of all cases  falling  under  the  Regulation, 
92%  could  be  cleared  in  the first Phase  whereas  Phase  2 
proceedings  were  initiated in the other  8%  of  cases. 
However,  8  cases  approved  under  Artie  le  ..  6. 1 (b)  were  cleared 
subject to the  inclusion of  specific  undertakings  offered  by 
the  parties. 
2.  Phase  2  proceedings  must  be  closed within  a  maximum  of  four 
months  by  means  of  a  decision  under Article  8  declaring 
either that 
- the concentration  is compatible with  the  common  market, 
but  may  be  subject  to conditions  and  obligations 
(Article  8(2));  or 
- the  concentration is incompatible with  the  common  market 
and  is prohibited  (Article  8(3)). 
To  date  there  has  been  one  prohibition,  but  in  seven other 
cases  the final  decision  was  subject to conditions  and/or 
obligations.  In the other  two  cases  no  conditions  or 
obligations were  attached. 
Article  9(2)  referrals  and Article  22(3)  applications 
3.  Under  Article  9(2),  a  Member  State may  request  the 
commission to refer to it notified concentrations  which 
threaten to create or  strengthen  a  dominant  position  in  a 
distinct market  within its territory.  To  date  five  such 
requests  have  been  received.  In three cases  the  commission 
initiated.Phase  2  proceedings  and  in  one  case  the  operation 
was  cleared in Phase  1.  In  the  remaining  case  there  was 
partial referral  and  partial clearance. 
under Article  22(3)  a  Member  State may  request  the  appli-
cation of  the  Regulation to concentrations  having  no 
community  dimension.  The  only  request to date  was  that  of 
the  Belgian Government  that  the  Commission  investigate the 
effect of  the  acquisition  by  British Airways  of  Dan  Air's 
scheduled air service activities on  the  Belgian market. - 4  -
Profile of  cases notified 
4.  of  those  cases  notified,  the majority were  in industrial 
manufacturing  particularly the  food  and  drink,  chemicals  and 
motor  vehicle sectors.  Nonetheless,  nearly half of  the 
operations notified included service activities,  particu-
larly retailing,  insurance,  computing,  banking  and  whole-
saling.  These  results reflect general trends  in the merger 
activity of  the  thousand  or  so  largest companies  operating 
in the  Community. 
Most  of  the operations  concerned either majority acquisi-
tions  or establishment of  joint ventures  in fairly  even 
proportions. 
5.  By  far  the majority of  notifications  concerned  undertakings 
from  France,  Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom,  with  French 
companies  being  particularly active  (involved  in  just over 
half  of all operations  notified) .  This  picture was  true of 
acquisitions  generally ~ver the  same  period. 
With  regard to  non-Community  undertakings,  the  most  active 
have  been  companies  from  the  United States,  which  were 
involved in about  a  quarter of all notifications,  followed 
by  companies  from  sweden,  switzerland  and  Japan. 
Reflecting the  aims  of  the  Merger  Regulation,  nearly three 
quarters  of all notified cases  concerned  undertakings  from 
different Member  states or  from  one  Member  state  and  a  non-
Member  state.  The  balance  related to  firms  of  the  same 
nationality or  extra-Community  companies  only. 
6.  Similarly,  analysis  of  the  individual case decisions  show 
that  64%  of decisions  in the  first  two  years  involved 
Community-wide  markets  and  a  further  11%  concerned markets 
extending  over  more  than  one  Member  State. 
B.  EFFECTIVENESS  OF  THE  IMPLEMENTATION  OF  THE  REGULATION 
The  effect on  competitive conditions 
7.  over the  last three  years  the  commission  has  aimed  to apply 
the  Regulation  in  conformity with its fundamental  objec-
tives:  allowing  concentrations  which  bring  about  necessary 
corporate  reorganisations  in the  Community  as  a  result of 
the  opening  of  national markets  to  Community  and  world 
markets,  while  prohibiting or modifying  concentrations  which 
are  likely to result  in  lasting damage  to effective  compe-
tition in the  common  market  or  in  a  substantial part of  it. 
The  first category  of  concentrations must  be  welcomed 
because  they  stimulate  a  dynamic  of  competition  in the 
common  market,  open  up  national markets  and  increase the 
competitiveness  of  European  industry  by  improving  the cost 
structure of  the  undertakings  and  by  stimulating  innovation 
in  a  wider  competitive environment.  The  second  category of 
concentrations  is harmful  to  the  development  of  the  internal 
market  because  they  remove  the  pressure  of  competition 
necessary  to achieve  the  benefits  of  the  process  of  reorga-
nisation.  The  maintenance  and  development  of  effective 
competition  plays  a  central  role  in the  functioning  of  the - 5  -
internal market·in terms  of trade  flows  and  best allocation 
of  resources of the  economy. 
The  very existence of  EEC  merger  control legislation, 
supplemented by  the considerable  amount  of  informal 9uidance 
given to undertakings  by  the commission's  services,  has 
arguably  a  significant preventive effect on  anti-competitive 
business  strategies  in the  Community.  With  respect  to 
formally  notified cases  the  percentage of cases  where  the 
commission  raised serious doubts  leading either to a.modifi-
cation of the concentration  plan already in  Phase  1  or to an 
opening of Phase  2  proceedings  amounted  to around  15%  (20 
cases out of  142  as  of  30.06.93).  This  percentage  is 
comparable to that of other merger control  agencies~ 
·The  commission prohibited one  merger  because  no  other remedy 
wa's  available to  remove  the  dominant  position which would 
have  been created by  the merger  (Alenia-Aerospatiale/de 
Havilland).  In all other cases,  where  the  serious doubts 
were  confirmed  by  the outcome  of  the  investigation,  the 
parties modified their original concentration plan  in such  a 
'way  as to  remov~ the competition  problem.  In those  cases, 
effective competition was  preserved and developed  through 
mainly  three types of  remedies: 
the  removal  of  barriers  to entry to the  market  concerned 
such  as  the cancellation of  exclusive distribution agree-
ments,  the opening  up  of  supply or sales markets  which 
were  previously  foreclosed or the  severance of vertical 
links  between  the merging  firms  and  the  final  customers 
(cf.  Fiat/Ford,  TNT/Canada  Post et;al.,  Grand 
Metropolitan/  Cinzano,  Elf Aquitaine/Minol, 
Air  France/Sabena,  British Airways/TAT  and 
Alcatel/Telettra); 
- the  ending of capital,  personal or contractual  links 
between competitors  in oligopolistic markets  (cf. 
courtaulds/SNIA,  Varta/Bosch,  Neatl~/Perrier); 
- the divestiture of  assets or  share~ to  reduce  the market 
share of  the merging  firms  and  facilitate the entry  by  new 
competitors  (cf.  Magneti  Marelli/CEAc,  Accor/Wagons-Lits, 
Nestl~/Perrier,  Du  Pont/ICI,  KNP/BT/VRG).  . 
Specific  impact  on  national markets 
8.  National merger control  legislations examine  mergers, 
including mergers  having  a  cross-border  impact,  from  a 
national  perspective  (effects  on  the  national  market).  The 
EEC  Regulation  on  the  other  hand  has  entrusted the 
Commission with the  task  of  examining  the effect of  mergers 
on  the structure of  competition  at.Community  level,  i.e.: 
- the market-partitioning effect of mergers  resulting  from 
dominant  positions on  national markets  (danger  of  national 
champions)  and 
- the  anti-competitive effect of  mergers  creating dominant 
positions at  Community  level through  single-firm dominance 
·or oligopolistic  dominance  resulting  from  too  narrow 
supply  structures. - 6  -
In its implementation  of  the  Regulation,  the  commission  has 
prevented  a  number  of  dominant  positions  which  could  have 
foreclosed national markets  (e.g.  Fiat/Ford,  Alcatel/ 
Telettra,  Magneti  Marelli/CEAc,  Varta/Bosch,  Accor/Wagons-
Lits,  Nestle/Perrier).  It has  also closely examined  cases 
with  a  narrow supply  structure at Community  level  (e.g. 
Du  Pont/ICI,  Tetrapak/Alfa-Laval,  Thorn  EMI/Virgin,  Rhone-
Poulenc/SNIA). · 
Link  between  community  and  national merger  control policies 
9.  With  increasing integration of  EC  markets,  there  are  less 
and less markets  of  purely national dimension.  This  trend 
towards  integration of  national markets  is in itself 
procompetitive  and  the  implementation of  the Regulation  must 
take  this factor  into account.  It is  in part reflected in 
the  high  number  of  clearance decisions.  However,  the 
Commission  has  to take  a  realistic view  by  defining  geogra-
phic  markets  in  relation to the  area where  competition 
actually occurs  (national,  EEC  or  even  world markets). 
Since  the  adoption  of  the  EEC  Regulation  most  Member  States 
now  have merger  control  laws  for  mergers  below  the  thres-
holds  of  the  Regulation.  This  development  is welcomed  by  the 
commission  since it guarantees  a  complete  system of  protec-
tion of effective competition at national  and  Community 
level. 
The  main  objective of  the  national  legislations  is of  course 
the  prevention of  dominant  positions  at national  level. 
However,  this control can  lead to: 
- authorisations  of  mergers  without taking  into account  the 
negative effects at Community  level, 
- authorisations  of  mergers  in  several  Member  states without 
taking  into  account  the  cumulative  effect of  these 
mergers. 
These  effects can  only  be  mitigated  by  a  lowering  of  the 
thresholds  or  by  according  the  commission  the  right  to deal 
with  concentrations  notifiable  under  the  legislation of  two 
or more  Member  States. 
If  firms  within  the  Community  are  to  be  able  to develop 
their business  on  a  Community-wide  basis  and  subject to  a 
common  set of rules,  it is essential that the  objectives  and 
methodology  and  procedures  of  national  and  community  merger 
policies  should as  far  as  possible converge.  otherwise, 
there  is the  real  danger  of  undertakings  seeking  to tailor 
their proposed mergers  in  such  a  way  as  to fall  under  one 
jurisdiction rather than  another  ("forum-shopping"),  whether 
between  national  jurisdictions,  or  between  national  and 
Community  jurisdiction. 
Use  of referrals  procedures 
10.  The  Regulation  has  a  built-in safeguard  for  cases  where 
action  is better carried out  at  the  national  level  even  if - 7  -
all .the thresholds of the  EEC  Regulation are fulfilled. 
Article  9  provides  for referral of  such cases  by  the 
commission to the national authorities·. in accordance with 
the subsidiarity principle. 
out of the  five  requests  for  referral mentioned  above  four 
were  from  the  Bundeskartellamt;  one  from  the competent  UK 
authorities.  In three cases  (Varta/Bosch,  Mannesmann/  Heesch 
and siemens/Philips)  the  Comission  recognised  the  existence 
of  a  threat to competition.  The  commission  therefore decided 
to deal with the case itself by  initiating-Phase  2 
proceedings.  In  general the reason  why  the  comm'ission 
decided  upon this course  of  action,  notwithstanding the 
particular threat to effective competition  in the Member 
state concerned,  was  that the extent of  the  geographic 
reference market  was  not  known  with certainty at the date of 
the decision particularly having  regard to the  fact that 
markets  were  in  a  state of progressive integration. 
In one  of the  two  remaining  requests  for  referral  (Alcatel/ 
AEG  Kabel),  the  commission  concluded that  a  threat to a 
distinct local or regional market  did not exist.  The 
commission therefore cleared the case after first having 
addressed  a  decision to this effect to the national 
authority concerned. 
In the  remaining  case  (Steetley Tarmac)  the  Commission 
concluded that for  some  of the  product markets  concerned 
(e.g.  bricks),  a  threat to  a  geo~raphic market  of  a  local 
nature existed.  Moreover,  given  the  specific characteristics 
of  the other  product markets  conc'en)ed  there were  no· or 
insignificant spillover effects on  markets  outside  the 
Member  state concerned.  Therefore,  the  Commission  referred 
the assessment of  these  product markets  to the  competent 
national authority. 
III.  SCOPE  OF  REGULATION  REVISION 
A.  TURNOVER  THRESHOLDS 
The  existing thresholds 
1.  The  establishment of the existing turnover thresholds  in 
1989  was  made  on  the  basis of  very uncertain  forecasts  as 
the exact frontiers  they wou·id  draw  between  the volume  and 
nature of cases  which would  be  notifiable at community  level 
and  those  which  would  be  left to· national  jurisdiction.  The 
council  recognised this uncertainty  by  agreeing  itself to 
review the existing thiesholds  w~thin fotir  years  following 
the  adoption of  the  Regulation  and  also  by  stating its 
readiness_to consider taking other  factors  into  accourit  in 
addition  to  turnover  when  the  thresholds  were  revised. 
The  original Commission  proposals  and declarations were 
based  on  the  assessment  that  a  main  threshold of  2 billion 
ECU  and  a  minimum  community  turnover threshold of 
100 million  ECU  would  in  normal  circumstances  cover  the  bulk 
of concentrations  having  a  significant impact  on  Community 
trade.  This  is  not to say  that there would  be  no  significant 
operations  below  these thresholds.  The  assumption  is that 
below this  level concentrations would  primarily have  a - 8  -
national  impact  and,  in  accordance with  the  subsidiarity 
principle,  would  therefore better be  handled at national 
level. 
Need  for  "one-stop shop"  and level  playing-field 
2.  At  the time of the  adoption  of  the  Regulation,  the  major 
advantages  of  an exclusive  Community  competence  for cross-
border mergers  were  identified as  the establishment of  a 
one-stop  shop  providing  a  level playing-field for merger 
control combined with rapid decision-making.  The  need  for  a 
one-stop  shop  and  level playing-field are  even  greater 
today. 
One  consequence  of the  advent  of  additional national  systems 
for merger control  (e.g.  in  Belgium,  Italy and  Portugal) 
will  be  an  increase  in the  number  of  potential  •stops'  at 
which  regulatory  approval will  be  required  for  a  given 
concentration.  This  will  be  particularly true  for  those 
operations  having  a  competitive  impact  reaching  across 
several  Member  states but which,  because  of  failure  to 
satisfy the existing threshold criteria,  do  not  benefit  from 
the  "one-stop  shop"  control available  under  the  Merger 
Regulation. 
At  the  same  time,  the  need  for  a  level playing-field is not 
restricted to the  largest companies  and  sectors.  With 
progressive  integration  in  the  single market,  cross-border 
trade will  increase  in  more  and  more  sectors  and  involve 
firms  of  smaller size.  The  relevant  geographic  market3 will 
increasingly be  the  Community  as  a  whole.  The  changes 
induced  by  the  single market  program  have  arguably  already 
provoked  an  unprecedented  wave  of  cross-border merger 
activity.  This  is  amply  demonstrated  by  an  analysis  of 
merger  activity4  as  shown  in Annex  1.  After the  launch  of 
the single market  programme  in  1985,  and  encouraged  by  a 
favourable  economic  climate,  there was  a  very  substantial 
increase  in merger  activity rising to  a  peak  in  1989/90.  oue 
to the  general  economic  downturn,  this  has  now  decreased, 
but merger  activity is still running  at  a  level  which  is 
approximately  25%  above  its  1986/87  level. 
However,  the  significant  point  is that this  peak  and  the 
maintained  high  level of  overall merger  activity is  prima-
rily due  to the  very  substantial  increase  in  community-wide 
as  opposed  to national operations.  Examination of  the first 
graph  in Annex  1  shows  that the  peak  for  national mergers 
was  only  30%  above  its  86/87  level  and  that this  activity 
has  now  returned to that  level.  For  Community-wide  mergers 
the  peak  was  250~ above  the  86/87  level  and  is  now  still 
double  that  level.  Moreover,  there  would still appear  to  be 
a  large  number  of  mergers  of  Community  interest falling 
outside  the  Regulation.  currently  only  about  50  to  60 
mergers  a  year  fall  under  the  Regulation.  This  has  to be 
compared with  the  282  Community  mergers  identified  in  the 
Commission's  latest Annual  Competition  Report  for  the  period 
91/92. 
3  Exceptions will of  course  remain,  e.g.  non-tradeable 
services  such  as  local retailing or construction 
4  cf.  Annual  competition  Reports  for  the  corresponding  years - 9  -
Operations  falling outside  the  current· thresholds 
3.  In addition to increasing cross-border activity  in·the 
community,  there is other evidence  which  shows  that there 
are still cases  falling  below  the current thresholds,  which 
have ·a·  size and  nature which  are  likely to affect  compe-
titive cbnditions 'in the  community  as  a  whole: and.therefore, 
in accordance with the subsidiarity principle,  would  be 
bet-ter  examined  under  a  single  community  jur_isdic.tion. 
During  the course  of  the application of  the existing 
Regulation,  the  Commission  has  frequently  encounte.red cases, 
usually through case presentation.by parties during  pre-
notification meetings,  where,  although the operation was 
likely to have  a  strong  impact  on  competitive conditions 
throughout  the  Community,  the  operation nevertheless  did  not 
fall  under  the Regulation  because  the. existing  ~hresholds 
represen.ted  by  the  5  billion·,  250  million and ·two-thirds 
rule were  not all satisfied.  specific  examples  demonstr.ating 
this point  ar~ li•ted in Annex  3. 
The  list in Annex  3  covers  a  wide  variety of  sectors  .. 
Particularly important cases -are  likely to arrive  in cases 
involving ·specific ·chemicals  or.  high  tech,nology  products 
where total turnover  for  the whole  product market concerned 
can  be  relatively small  compared  to the existing thresholds 
or where  turnover  for  the  sector is  low  generally,  e.g  .. 
textiles,  carpets  and  paper  products.  In  such  types  of 
cases,  even  if  a  very  large  company  with  annual  turnover 
exceeding  2  billion ECU  acquires  a  smaller  company  having  a 
high  community  market  share,  the  fact  that the  latter has  a 
Community  turnover  below the  threshold of  250  mECU,  ~ill 
mean  that the operation  falls  completely  outside  the-scope 
of  the  Community  Merger  Regulation; ·Consequently,  it. is  not 
sufficient ju•t to  reduce  the main  world  turnover·threshold. 
There  is in fact  an  even'greater  need to reduce  the 
community threshold.·· 
Traditionally analysis  has  focused  on  the  industrial sector 
but  appropriate  regard  must  also .be  had  to the  increa,singly 
important  service sector.  Although  a  large  part of these 
service activities·relate to non-tradeable.services,  there 
remain  key  activities  in  the  service sector such.as 
publishing, ·advertising  and  computer  services~,whicb are 
increasingly being  structured on  cross-border lines  but, 
with the existing thresholds,  remain  outside  the  scope  of 
community  jurisdiction. 
survey results 
4.  In  oL·d.~r  t.o  inv<~!;t iqate  the  practical  impact  of  threshold 
.n•duc  t ion  the  conuni s s iun  has  conducted  a  spec i a 1  survey 
among  nearly  300  of  the  Community's  largest  business  under-
takings  as well  as  among  associations  representing  the  views 
of  the  business  community.  This  survey  was  felt  necessary 
because  the  available data  bases  on  merger  and  acquisitions 
were  ill-adapted to the  analysis  required,  primarily because 
of  the  absence  of  community  and  Member  state data which  is - 10  -
critical for the application of  the two-thirds  rule.  A 
further difficulty was  obtaining data  on  joint venture 
operations. 
The  survey  aimed to establish what  additional operations 
would  have  fallen  under  the  Merger  Regulation  in  1991  and 
1992  had the  various  thresholds  been  relaxed  by: 
- lowering the world-wide  turnover  threshold  from  5  to 
2  billion ECU, 
- reducing the  Community  turnover  from  250  to  100  million 
ECU, 
- abolishing the  two-thirds  rule. 
Given  the difficulties  in the  application of  the  turnover 
rules  to the  financial  sector,  banks  and  insurance  companies 
were  purposely excluded  from  the  sample.  Non  Community  com-
panies  were  also excluded.  Although  the  identified sample  is 
not comprehensive,  it is believed to cover,  subject to the 
exceptions mentioned,  the vast majority of  companies  in the 
community  having  an  annual  turnover  exceeding  2  billion ECU. 
France,  Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom  - the  three countries 
representing the great bulk  of merger activity in the 
Community  - represent over  80%  of  the  276  companies 
contacted.  Participation in  the  survey was  on  a  voluntary 
basis  and  174  companies  have  replied to date.  This  corres-
ponds  to  a  response  rate of  63~. 
Forecast  number of extra  cases 
5.  Extrapolating  from  the  results of  this  survey,  a  forecast 
can  be  made  of  the  expected  number  of  extra cases  falling 
within the  scope  of  the  Regulation if the  world-wide 
turnover threshold were  reduced  from  5  to  2  billion  ECU,  in 
accordance with  the commission's  declaration at the  time  of 
adoption of  the  Regulation,  and if a  corresponding  reduction 
were  made  in the  Community  turnover  threshold  from  250  to 
100  million  ECU.  The  forecast  extra annual  number  of  cases 
falling under  the  Regulation  is  50  extra cases  if the  two-
thirds  rule  is maintained. 
As  merger  activity is subject to considerable  fluctuation it 
is  impossible to predict precisely the extra  number  of  cases 
which  would  be  covered.  However  the  above  orders  of  magni-- 11  -
tude  are comparable  to the  forecasts  of  the British and 
German  merger c·ontrol authorities.  Both estimated that  ~if 
the current thresholds  were  reduced there would  be  an · 
approximate  doubling of  th~ 50-60  ~ases·a year·~urrently 
handled  by  the  Commis'sion. 
The  two-thirds rule 
.·' 
6.  In the  survey,  the current two-thirds  rule did not  play  a 
role  in  33  operations,  of  which  24  had· a  c-ross-border 
impact. 
In  20  operations  the  two-thirds  exclusion  rule  came  into 
play.  Ni~e cases  concerned  sectors  such  as  retailing or 
construction  and  building  produ6t~ where  normally  the · ' 
geographical reference market  would  be  local or regional  and 
where  the competitive assessment  of  such  operations would  in 
general  be  better handled at the  national  level;  On  the· 
other  hand  for  the remaining  11  cases,  the  geographical 
reference market concerned  by  the  operation was  almost" 
always  much  wider  than  the  Member  State  for  which  the  two-
thirds rule  applied.  For  example,  these cases  concerned 
sectors  such as  steel,  textiles,  automobile  components, 
machine  tools  and  electric equipment  for  railways. 
If the  two-thirds  rule were  replaced  by  a  three-quarters 
rule,  all 9  cases wheie  a  geogiaphical  reference  market  was 
of  a  national nature would still all be  excluded,  whereas  of 
the  11  other cases,  7  would  now  no  longer  be  excluded.  More 
particularly,  each  case-~pecifically mentioned  above  concer-
ning  a  sector hav{ng  a  geographical  r~ference market  typi-
cally much  widei  than  the  national  level,  would  not  ~e 
excluded. 
The  three-quarters rule could therefore  arguably represent  a 
better calibration of  the  existing'rul~ for  separating  those 
cases  having  only  a  national  dimension  an·d  better dealt with 
at the  national  level  from  those  cases  where"a  wider-
Community  dimension  was  involved.  A  further  possibility 
would  be  a  derogation of  the  two-thirds  rule  in  cases  where 
the merging  companies  have  a  substantial  absolute  Community 
turn~ver outside the  M~mber state  wher~ the  requir~ments of 
the two-thirds  rule  are  fulfilled.  This  would  mean  that  the 
two-thirds  rule would  not  apply  wher~ the turnover  in other 
Member·states  exceeds  a  certain threshold.  This-proposal 
would  in particular solve  the  problem  th~t large  groups  of 
companies  such  as  Siemens  or Daimler  Benz  come  frequently 
under  the two-thirds  rule,  given  their strong  home  markets 
and  considerable exports  to countries outside the  Ec, 
although the mergers  where  they  are  involved  have  frequently 
substantial repercussions  acres's  the  community. 
Position of Community institutions 
7.  The  European  Parliament  has  already  formally  stated that it 
is  in  favour  of  reducing  thresholds.  More  sp•cifically,  in 
its Resolution  on  the  Nineteenth  Report  on  Competition 
Policy5,  which  was  adopted  on  24th  January  1991,  Parliament 
5  cf.  Point  26  of  the  ~esolution as  well. as ·Point  25  of  the 
preceeding  DESMOND  Report  (Document  A3-0374/90). - 12  -
considered that the  aggregate world  turnover  threshold of 
ECU  5  billion was  unrealistically high  and that,  having 
regard to the  inadequate basis  provided  by  Article  89  of  the 
EEC  Treaty  for  the  assessment of concentrations  below the 
thresholds,  it would  support  any  proposal  to  reduce  the 
thresholds  provided for  in Article  1  of  the  Regulation. 
Similarly,  the  Economic  and Social  Committee  has  raised the 
question of whether  the threshold at which  merger control is 
triggered is not  unduly  high.  In  its Opinion6  on  the 
Twenty-first Report  on  competition  Policy it expressed the 
view that the  main  threshold of  ECU  5  billion was  too high 
and  that it gave  rise to  a  major  series of  doubts. 
Furthermore,  it considered that this threshold could  neither 
be  justified from  an  economic  nor  from  a  competition  policy 
point of view. 
Position of national  administration  and  competition  agencies 
8.  Experts  from the Member  States  and  representatives of 
naional competition agencies  were  consulted extensively  on 
the result of  the  Commission's  survey  and  the  advisability 
of  the  threshold reduction,  in  particular at  a  multilateral 
meeting  on  21st June  1993. 
A  majority of  national authorities  expressed satisfaction 
with the existing Regulation  but were  reluctant to envisage 
threshold reduction without  further experience  of  the  impact 
of  the  Regulation.  While  acknowleding  the benefits of  the 
"one-stop"  shop  and  level playing  field,  they  remained 
unconvinced  that there was  a  sufficient  number  of  cases 
below  the existing thresholds  which  raised  problems,  either 
in  terms  of  operations  being  covered  by  several 
jurisdictions or  because  the  operations  concerned  genuinely 
endangered competitive conditions  in  the  Community  as  a 
whole  and  would  not  be  dealt with  adequately  by  national 
authorities.  In this context they  recalled the  recent 
strengthening of  national merger  control policies  in 
Belgium,  Italy,  Portugal  and  Spain. 
Some  national authorities  suggested  too that  inflation would 
gradually erode  the real value  of  thresholds  and  that the 
addition of  turnover  in the  new  Member  states after enlar-
gement  in  1995  would  mean  that  some  operations  would  be 
eligible that are  not  eligible  now.  The  commission 
acknowledges  these  factors  but  is  of  the  view  that their 
potential  impact  on  jurisdiction is  limited. 
Two  authorities  link  the  question of  threshold reduction  to 
the  establishment  of  an  independent  investigation  procedure, 
including,  in  the  longer  term,  the creation  of  a  European 
cartel office. 
Some  authorities  believe that  any  extension of  community 
competence  for  mergers  should  be  examined  in  the  wider 
context  of  a  general  review of  the  share-out of  tasks 
between  the commission  and  the  Member  States  in  the  appli-
cation of  the Treaty articles on  competition. 
6  cf.  Point  1.3.2 of  the Opinion  on  the  TWenty-first  Report  on 
Competition Policy  adopted  by  the  Economic  and  social 
committee  on  25th  November  1992. - 13  -
observations of national  industry associations,  individual 
undertakings 
9.  The  UNICE  and  International  Chamber  of  commerce  favour  only 
a  reduction of the main  threshold  from  5  to  2  bECU,  with  no 
other changes  for the moment. 
The  BDI,  CBI  and  VNO/NCW-Netherlands  are  strongly  in  favour 
of reduction of the world turnover threshold  and  the 
removal/relaxation of  the two-thirds rule.  With  exception of 
the  BDI,  they  do  not wish  to see  a  reduction of  the 
Community  threshold of  250  mECU.  The  CNPF,  AGREF  and 
confindustria are  broadly  against threshold reduction, 
although Confindustria would  appear  in  favour  of  a  step-wise 
increase  in  future  Community  competence.  The  Danish  and 
Greek  Industry Associations  appear  against  lowering-
thresholds. 
All  ihdustry  associations  are  ~pposed to  an  enlargement  of 
the current scope  of Article  9,  largely on  the  b.asis  that it 
would  undermine  the one-stop  shop  principle. 
The  positions are  summarised  in Annex  2  Part  B.  The  indivi-
dual  comments  of  the  large  undertakings  indicated  in Annex  2 
Part c,  generally reflect the  position of  the  national 
industry associations. 
Impact  of extra workload for  the Commission 
10.  Representatives  of  business,  of  legal  firms  and  of  national 
authorities have  raised concern  as  to whether  the  Commission 
would  be  able to maintain the  effectivess  of  the  existing 
control procedures  if it had  to deal  with  the  increased 
wnr·klnad  which  threshnld  nO>dnction  would  brinq  with  it. 
Due  to  a  number  of  factor~ the  conunission  believes  that  the 
increase  in staffing necessary  to deal  with extra cases 
following  threshold reduction  would  be  significantly less 
than  the  proportionate  increase  in the  number  of  cases  (from 
!  60  to  110  a  year).  However  it is clear that the  additional 
resources  required would  have  to be  taken  into account  by 
the council and  the  commission  in their final decision  on 
the question. 
Overall assessment 
11.  If  the  turnover  thresholds  w~re reduced  in  accordance with 
the  Commission's  declaration,  an  additional  50  cases?  would 
fall  under  the  Regulation.  However,  if no  change  were  made 
to the  community  turnover  threshold,  which  generally  seems 
to be  the  preference of  the  business  community,  the  number 
of  extra cases  is likely to  be  much  sma·ller  (up  to  20 
cases). 
12.  From  an  economic  pbint  of  view,  there  are  ~trong arguments 
for  a  reduction  of  the current  thresholds  in Article  1(2). 
The  progressive  integration  of  the markets  within  the 
7  or  60  cases  if the  two-thirds  rule  is  replaced  by  a  three-
quarters  rule - 14  -
conwunity  and,  linked to this,  the  increase  in  the  number  of 
cross-border transactions  require  an  extended  scope  of  the 
community  rules  on  mergers  in order  that cross-border 
operations  can  be  dealt with fairly according  to  a  common 
set of  rules  and  by  one,  rather than  several,  competition 
agencies  throughout  the  Community. 
However  there  are  clear hesitations  among  the  competent 
authorities  and  competition  agencies  at national  level  on 
the  need  to proceed to  an  immediate  reduction  in thresholds 
without  further experience  of  the  application of  the 
existing Regulation. 
This  preliminary  assessment  on  thresholds  is expanded  in the 
general  conclusions  to the  paper  under  point  IV. 
Use  of other criteria  to  determine  jurisdiction 
13.  The  application  of  fixed quantitative thresholds  is  inevi-
tably  an  approximate  and  somewhat  crude  method  for  alloca-
ting  jurisdiction between  the  national  and  Community  levels. 
Ideally,  it would  be  possible  to take  into  account  both 
sectoral  and  qualitative criteria.  The  difficulty  is that 
such  criteria create  genuine  problems,  especially within  the 
Community  framework  for  merger  control  which  is  based  on  an 
ex-ante control with  rapid  decision-making. 
Whilst  other criteria,  such  as  market  share data,  can  be 
useful  to help determine  jurisdiction they  are often unavai-
lable or  imprecise.  Usually,  they  can  only  be  accurately 
established after extensive analysis  and  in critical. cases 
are  frequently  a  subject of contention. 
similarly,  another question that could  be  considered  is  the 
introduction of differentiated thresholds  on  a  sectoral 
basis.  This  too  would  raise considerable  problems.  There 
would  in  the  first  place  be  the difficulty nf  establishing 
varying  thresholds  by  sector  in  terms  of  obtaining  an 
"equivalent"  measure  for  merger  control.  The  application of 
the  current thresholds  would  also  become  much  more  complex, 
particularly  in cases  concerning  firms  active  across  a 
number  of  sectors. 
At  the  level of  the  individual  undertakings,  turnover  data 
is nearly  always  fully  available  and  objective.  The  present 
approach  has  the  great  advantage  of  providing  legal 
certainty in relation to  jurisdictional allocation. 
The  theoretical  advantages  gained  by  the  introduction  of 
other criteria such  as  sectoral or qualitative data,  would 
therefore  be  considerably outweighed  by  the  practical diffi-
culties they  would raise. 
H.  ART~CLE _.2_@_  REFERRALf>  AND  ARTICLE  22 ( 3)  APPLICATIONG 
14.  The  turnover  of  undertakings  and  the size  of  product  markets 
vary  considerably  by  economic  sector.  on  average  a  petro-
chemicals  company  has  much  higher  turnover  than  a  textile 
company.  A  single threshold will necessarily  have  a  varying 
impact  on  a  sectoral basis.  The  only  way  to obtain  the  same 
advantages  of  single  Community  jurisdiction  for  those - 15  -
sectors with  below average  turnover is  a  reduction  in thres-
holds.  on  the other hand,  for  sectors where  average  turnover 
is relatively high,  one  consequence  of threshold reduction 
is the possibility that there may  be  an  increase  in 
notification of more  nationally oriented mergers  in these 
particular sectors.  Referral of  such  cases  by  the  Commission 
to the.Member states allows  some  fine-tuning  in case allo-
cation.  This  raises the question as  to whether there  should 
be  a  more  flexible  approach  to referral under Article  9  in 
the interests of  a  more  balanced allocation of  cases  between 
the  Commission  and  the  Member  states. 
There  are  a  variety of  technical  changes  that  could  be  made 
to Article  9  to achieve  this objective.  The  following 
changes  could,  for  example,  be  envisaged: 
- where  an  operation  con~erns· only markets  representing  a 
non-substantial· part of the  Community  (i.e.  local or 
regional)  within  a  Member  state the threat requirement 
could  ~e removed.  This  would.mean  in  p~actice that the 
commission would  always,  upon  request,  refer  a  case  back 
to the  Member  State concerned where  a  concentration  has  no 
impact  on  a  substantial part of  the  community; 
- the threat requirement  could  be  removed  for all cases 
where  a  Member  state demonstrates  that  an  operation only 
concerns  a  distinct market within that  Member  state,. be it 
a  substantial part of  the  common  market  or  not. 
However,  since  it·is  now  the  general  position of  the 
commil1sion  to either refer  a  case  tu  n.-ttional  authorities  ot· 
open  Phase  II proceedings  where  a  justified request  for  case 
referral has  been  lodged,  it is  gener'ally  considered that 
the current terms  of Article  9  provide  an  adequate 
instrument if existing turnover  thresholds  were  maintained. 
15.  Lastly,  certain concentrations  falling  below  the  thresholds 
may  still have  a  significant  impact  on  competition across 
national  boundarie~~ It would  therefore  seem sensible to 
keep 'the possibility open  for  Member  States to refer cases 
to the  Commission  tinder  Article  22. 
conclusion on  referrals 
From  the  experience  gained  and  the evolution  in the 
commission's  practice with  regard  to application of 
At· tic  lt>  ')I  there  appearn  to  bt?  no  case  for  amendment  of  the 
referrals  procedures  of  th~ Regulation  at this stage. 
However  the matter could  be  looked  at  again  in  the  proposed 
future  review of  the  Regulation  by  some  adjustments  of  the 
referrals  procedures. 
C.  OTHER  IMPROVEMENTS  REQUIRING  A  CHANGE  IN  THE  REGULATION 
16.  In the  context of  the  review of  the  Merger  Regulation,  the 
commission  has  also examined  a  number  of  other  possible 
improvements  to the  Regulation  which  were  mainly  related to 
procedural  issues.  In  this  respect,  a  distinction has  to  be. 
made  between  those  procedural  changes  which  need  an  amend-
ment  of  the  Regulation  and  those  which  can  be  implemented  by 
the  Commission  on  its own  authority. - 16  -
(i)  commitments  in the first  phase 
17.  As  has  already  been described  above,  during  the  first years 
of  merger  control the  commission  has  felt it justified to 
accept  commitments  from  companies  in  Phase  1  examination.  It 
has  done  so  in cases  where  the  competition  concern  was 
clear-cut,  could easily be  remedied  and  where  compliance  was 
easily monitored.  Examples  were  Fiat/Ford New  Holland, 
Elf/Minol,  Courtaulds/Snia  and British Airways/TAT.  This 
provided the  notifying parties with  an  option to modify 
their concentration plan  so  as  to  remove  serious  doubts 
presented by  the  original plan without needlessly  suffering 
the  loss of time  incurred in entering Phase  2  proceedings. 
Such  an  approach  provides  a  regulatory  response  propor-
tionate to the size of  the  competition  problem  and  the 
remedy  already at hand.  Secondly,  Recital  B of  the  Imple-
menting  RegulationS  provides  for  the  commission  services  to 
discuss difficulties encountered with  the  companies 
concerned at any  stage  in  the  procedure. 
It nevertheless raises questions  with  regard  to  procedure 
and  especially transparency  and  to the ability of  the 
commission to enforce  commitments  which  can  only  be  ful-
filled after the clearance  decision  has  been  adopted.  Under 
other competition  jurisdictions,  proposed  undertakings  must 
be  made  public  before  they  can  be  accepted  in  a  final 
decision.  Publication of  the  proposed  undertakings  before 
the  final  commission  decision  would  give  competitors  and 
interested third parties  the  opportunity to comment. 
The  following  amendments  to Article  6(l)b could therefore  be 
considered: 
it could  be  explicitly stipulated that  the  Commission  may 
attach to its decision  conditions  and  obligations  ; 
- subject to confidentiality provisions  the  commitments 
proposed  by  the parties  could  be  made  known  to third 
parties,  and  if appropriate,  published  in  the official 
Journal  of  the  European  Communities; 
- in addition,  if it had  received  settlement  proposals  at  a 
late stage  the  commission  could  be  empowered  to  prolong 
the  usual  time  limit of  one  month  for  Phase  1,  by  a 
maximum  of  one  additional  month; 
- as  a  corollary it would  be  necessary  to  foresee  the  same 
penalties  as  for Article  8(2)  decisions  in  the  event  of 
any  failure  to fulfil  undertakings. 
This  new  procedure  would  not  only  allow the  commission  to 
obtain  a  better  knowledge  of  the  practical  implications  of 
the  envisaged conditions,  but  it would  also  allow  Member 
states to be  fully  informed  of  any  undertakings  envisaged 
and,  if  necessary,  to  make  their views  known  in  due  time. 
8  commission  Regulation  (EEC)  No.  2367/90  of  25  July  1990 - 17  -
(ii)  Improving  transparency of  commitments  in the  second  phase 
18 ..  For the  same  reasons  as  outlined under  point  17  ·above,  the 
commission  could,  subject to business ··s.ecrecy ,··make  proposed 
settlements  known  to third pariies and,  where  appropriate, 
publish. commitments  proposed in  Phase  2  cases  in  the  EC 
Official Journal.  This  would  render the  Commission  procedure 
more  transparent and  give  third parties  a  fuller opportunity 
to comment. 
Experience  shows,  however,  that the parties concerned 
frequently.propose  commitments  only at  a  relatively late 
stage of the  second phase.  where  a  commitment  is·prop6sed 
immediately before or after the meeting  of  the Advisory 
Committee it would  normally  not  be  possible,  given the 
procedural constraints of  Phase  2  proceedings,  to publish 
the  proposed commitments,  grant third parties adequate  time 
to comment  and  consult Member  states  ··before  any  final· deci-
sion  is  adopted within  the original deadline.  Taking  into 
account  the  requirements  of  transparency  and  the  rights of 
third parties  on  the  one  hand  ind  the  procedural constraints 
on _the  other hand,  it appears  that  an  appropriate  and 
.  .  ~J 
balanced solution would  be  that: 
- the· commission  would  be  empowered  to prolong -the  usual 
time  limit of  four  months  for  Phase  2  by  a  maximum· of  one 
additional month,  where  commitments  were  not  proposed 
~ufficiently in·advance of  the  meeting  of  the'Advisory 
committee  under Article  18(1)'; 
- the  commission may  communicate  the  proposed  commitments  to 
interested third parties and,  where  appropriate,  publish 
them  in  ~he official  Jou~n~l before the  ado~tioh of  a 
'cleara~ce decision. 
(iii)  changes  with respect to  banking  and credit institutions 
19.  For  the  purposes  o~ the  application of  the  turnover rules to 
banks  (i.e.  credit  and  other  financial  institutions),  assets 
and  loans  and  advances  are used as  a  tool to generate 
notional turnover.  This  is prescribed  in ~he existing 
. Article  5 ( 3) a  of  the  Regulation"  However,  the  cornmiss'ion • s 
experience  in  banking  cases  ~o date  has  sho~n weaknesses  in 
the ability of  th~s ·approach  to'pruvide  solutions  to 
problems  such  as:· 
- the  allo~ation of  turnover  b~ geographical  area;  and 
- the calculation of  turnover  for  institutions whose  activi-
ties either do  not  include  lending or  advanc ii'tg  money,  or 
are widely  diversified. 
Council  and  Commission  partially anticipated this  problem. 
In  th~ir joint declaration,  they  considered that  "the 
criterion.defined as  a  proportion of  assets  should  be 
replaced  by  a  concept  of  banking  income  as  referred to in 
Directive  86/635."  This  Directive  is  now  implemented  in 
I:~V•··t·y  Mt!lllhet•  r:tatl". 
The  use  of  the  bankin<J  inconle  criterion which  includes 
mainly  interest  income,  income  from  securities,  commissions - 18  -
receivable  and net profit on  financial operations  has 
several advantages.  It enables credit and  financial 
institutions to be  afforded equal  treatment;  it allows  non-
lending  income  to  be  takerl  into account  and  it provides  a 
better reflection of  the  economic  reality behind  the 
activities of  these  financial  institutions.  The  u~e of· the 
banking  income criterion thus  appears  more  coherent  and 
consistent. 
(iv)  Appraisal criteria 
20.  In  its resolution of  lOth  october  1991  (OJ  No.  c  280/140  of 
28.10.91),  the  European  Parliament called on  the  Commission 
for  a  proposal to the council  to  amend  the  Merger  Regulation 
with  a  view to including  in the  appraisal  of  mergers  crite-
ria reflecting social,  local,  regional  and  environmental 
policy considerations. 
It should  be  underlined here  that the  Merger  Regulation 
contributes  to the  fundamental  objective,  laid down  in 
Article  3A  and  130  of  the Maastricht Treaty of  ensuring 
undistorted competition within  an  open  market  economy.  In 
the  Commission's  view it is vital to maintain  these efforts 
through  the  Merger  Regulation,  given  the  fundamental 
importance  of effective competition  for  the  proper 
functioning  of _the  internal  market.  However  the  regulation 
also requires  the  commission  to carry  out  its appraisal of 
mergers  within  the  general  framework  of  the  achievement  of 
the  fundamental  objectives  referred to  in  the  Treaty  (see 
Recital  No.  13  and Article  2  para.  1  of  the  Merger 
Regulation).  Within  the  existing Treaty,  these  objectives 
cover  the  social,  regional  and  environmental  fields.  The 
treaty of Maastricht  adds  to  these objectives the explicit 
aim of  strengthening  industrial competitiveness. 
Subject to the objective of  ensuring effective competition, 
the  Commission  can therefore  assess  competitive  conditions 
and  in particular apply  the  test of  dominance  in  a  flexible 
way  which  takes  account,  as  far as  possible,  of  other 
Community  objectives. 
However  the  Commission  believes  that it would  be  wrong  to 
allow dominant  positions to  be  created on  the  Community 
market.  Such  a  policy could  initially harm  consumers  and 
would  ultimately act to the  detriment  of  European  firms 
themselves.  Sapped  by  a  lack  of  competitive  pressure  they 
would  become  less  cost efficient and  less  innovative  than 
their  foreign  competitors.  Nevertheless,  the  Commission will 
of  course  have  to take  account  of  the  strength of  foreign 
firms  both  in the  community  and  on  the  world market  when 
assessing  the  impact  of  a  merger  inside the  community.  At 
the  same  time,  the  strengthening  of  community  firms  to 
enable  them  to  be  better competitors  on  the  Community  market 
and  on  the world  market  can  and  must  be  taken  into account, 
provided of  course this does  not  result  in their obtaining  a 
dominant  position which  would  impede  effective competition. 
In  these  circumstances,  the  Commission considers that there 
are  insufficient grounds  for  any  proposal  to the council  to 
amend  the  assessment criteria set  down  in Article  2  of  the 
Requlatinn.  It  is  nevertht>le:J:>  fully  awart'  of  tht>  need  for - 19  -
it~ merger·decisions  to  be  firstly soundly·reasoned  in 
relation to the objectives  and criteria laid down. in the 
Regulation  and  secondly to be explained with  the maximum  of 
transparency subject to the protection of valid business 
secrets. 
D.  JOINT  VENTURES 
Distinction between  concentrative  and  cooperative JVs 
21.  The  distinction between concentrative  and  cooperative  JVs 
·has· proved to be,  in practice,  one  of  the most difficult 
problems  in applying  the· Merger  Regulatio,n,  structural,  full· 
function  JVs  fall  under ·the  Regulation provided that they do 
not give"rise to the coordination-of  competitive behaviour 
between the  parent companies  or between  them  and  the. JV 
(Article  3(2),  subpara.  2).  If such coordination is found  to 
exist,  the  JV  is rendered cooperative  and  is examined  under 
R•••JIIlill:inn  No.  17  and  /\1"1  i<:IP  Rr,  nf  t.ho>  'l'l"o.>aty. 
on  the  basis of  around  70  decisions  on  JVs  to  dat~ under  the 
Merger  Regulation,  it has  been  possible to establish  ~ 
certain case  law  and  to draw  a  clearer and more  realistic 
borderline between  concentrative  and  cooperative JVs.  This 
development is in line with  the commission's  Notice  on 
concentrative  and  cooperative  J.oint ventures which  provides 
that the principles set out  in this text will  be  followed 
and  further· developed  by  the  Commission's  practice ·in 
individual  ~ases~ 
The  case  law developed  in  the ,practice to date  has  esta-
blished  in particular the  following  principles: 
-where only  one  parent  company  stays  in  the  JV's  market 
while the· other parent  comp·any  is. eitheri inactive or 
withdraws  on  a  lasting basis  from  that market.the  JV  is 
normally considered to be  concentrative. 
the cooperative  elements  of. a  JV  do  not prevent.  the 
assumption  of  a  concentration where  they  are  only of  minor 
economic  importance  ('de minimis'  rule), 
- where  the coordination of  competitive  behaviour  between 
the parent companies  takes  place  on  geographic markets 
outside the  EC  and  has  no  appreciable effect on  compe-
tition within thg Ec;  the  JV  is considered to  be  ~oncen­
trative despite this coordination. 
For  the  purpose  of  legal  certainty,  the  Commission's  Notice 
on  c.:unct•ntrative  and  cnopo>rative  npl~rations should, .·there-
'fore,  be  modified  in  the  light of  the  c~se law  developed  in 
the  practice to date. 
Treatment  of cooperative  JVs 
22.  It has  been  recognised that,  compared with concentrative 
JVs,  the  treatment of  cooperative  full  function  JVs  under 
Regulation  No.  17  has  been  less  favourable  in terms  of  rapid 
proceedings  and  legal certainty.  since  some  of  these·JVs 
entail important changes  in  the  structure of  the - 20  -
participating undertakings,  the  Commission  decided  in 
December  1992  on  a  series of  measures  aimed  at facilitating 
the creation of cooperative JVs.  These  measures  include: 
- broadening of existing  group  exemptions, 
- publishing  a  notice  on  the  assessment of  cooperative  JVs, 
- speeding  up  proceedings  under  Regulation  No.  17  in cases 
of  cooperative full  function  JVs. 
These  new  measures  strengthen the  parallelism in the 
commission's  handling  of  joint ventures  under  the  Merger 
Regulation  on  the  one  hand  and  under  Regulation  No.  17  on 
the other.  some  experience  needs  to be  gained  in their 
implementation before the  need  for  further  improvements  is 
assessed. 
De  minimis  JVs 
23.  A  number  of  JVs  have  been  notified which either,  were  of 
insignificant economic  importance  or,  engaged  in activities 
outside the  community  having  no  or minimal  impact  within  the 
community. 
The  difficulty is that  some  cases,  notwithstanding the 
minimal  JV  turnover,  can  be  important.  This  can  be  because 
of  the  specific product market  concerned,  e.g.  in the  case 
Pechiney/Viag  the  JV  achieved  a  turnover  of  only  20  mECU  but 
already  had  a  33%  community  market  share.  In  other cases 
this  can  be  because  of  the  importance  of  their parents. 
Therefore,  it does  not  seem  advisable  to  remove  them  comple-
tely  from  the  scope  of  the  Regulation  - only  to  find  an 
efficient way  to deal with  them. 
This  could be  achieved  by  accepting  reduced notification 
requirements  for  JVs  having  annual  turnover  below  some 
threshold.  Based  on  experience  a  figure  between  20  and 
50  million  ECU  seems  suitable.  similarly,  it could also  be 
envisaged to  introduce  a  threshold.based  on  the  market 
shares  of  the  JV.  The  parties concerned would  need  complete 
only sections  1  and  2  of  Form  co  plus  provide  some  basic 
market  information  so that the  economic  significance of  the 
JV  could  be  properly  assessed. 
Furthermore,  joint ventures  which  are  only  engaged  in 
activities outside  the  community  need  to  be  examined  under 
simplified arrangements.  According  to the  "effects 
doctrine",  a  principle of  international  law,  an  antitrust 
authority has  jurisdiction on  those  operations  completed 
outside its territory which  have  direct or  indirect and 
reasonably  foreseeable effects  on  its territory.  In  the 
light of this doctrine,  it has  been  argued that where  a 
joint venture  obviously  has  no  impact  on  the  markets  within 
the  Community,  there  should  be  no  notification even  if the 
turnover criteria of  Article  1  are  fulfilled  by  its parent 
companies. 
However,  even  so it is  necessary  to carry out  a  cursory 
assessment of·the direct or  indirect effects of  an 
operation  on  Community  markets.  Moreover,  if there  is  no - 21  -
notification,  then  doubt  r~mains as.to  whe~her the operation 
concerned might  fall within the competence  of. the  Member 
states.  Under  these conditions,  a  pragmatic  approach  is the 
most  preferable,  featuring  in particular reduced 
notification requirements  and,  where  appropriate,  a  rapid 
'. 
decision-making  procedure  under. Article 6(l)b. 
Calculation of the  turnover of joint ventures 
24.  In their joint declaration,  the  council ·and  the  commission 
both considered that the method  of  allocating  the  turnover 
of  a  JV  between  its parents  should  be  reviewed.  under  the 
cu~rent provisions of  Art~cle 5(5),  turnover of  a  joinily 
controlled JV  is  shared equally  between  its parents,  iires-
pective of the size of  the  financial  or voting  interests. 
To  date this rule was  relevant  in only  a  few  cases.  These 
have  not  posed  diffic~lties and  the rule still remains  a 
valid one  from  the  perspective of  shared control.  The  rule 
should therefore  remain  unchanged. 
IV.  GENERAL  CONCLUSION  ON  THE  REVIEW 
A.  THRESHOLDS 
1.  .As. the  Commission  has  endeavoured to explain  in this 
memorandum  there  are  strong  economic  arguments  ~or thres-
hold reduction.  Mergers  which  may  have  a  significant cross-
border effect within  the  single market  are  of  concern  to  the 
Community  and it is logical  that with  progressive 
integration of  Community  markets  the  community  itself should 
monitor  and  control  them  according  to  a  common  set of' rules 
applied across  the  Member  states.  The  "one-stop"  shop 
principle is both  administratively sensible' and  good  for 
business.  The  Commission  nevertheless  believes  there is  a 
need  for  caution.  The  Regulation,  as  decided  in  1989,  has 
proved to be  a  considerable  success,  despite  some  initial 
scepticism.  Indeed there  is  now  widespread  acceptan~e  ~i  and 
satisfaction with the existing  arrangements  for  merger 
control  by  the  commission  among  not  only  the  business 
community  and  legal  firms  but  also with  national 
authorities. 
There  is  also  a  strong  level  of  commitment  both  at national 
level  and  at  community  level.to ensuring  the  Regulation  is 
applied effectively. 
Any  proposal  for  change  must  therefore  be  seen  to  bring 
tangible additional  benefits  and  not  ~all into questiofi  the 
progress  made  up  to  now.  In thii ~espect,  the  case  for 
threshold reduction rests principally on  the  judgement  as  to 
whether  mergers  not  covered  by  the existing thresholds will 
be  important  enough  in  terms  of  their effect on  cross-border 
trade  to  justify an  extension  of  community  jurisdiction.  If 
their cross-border effect is  important,  then it is essential 
to  lower  the thresholds.  Otherwise,  business  will  suffer 
from the  lack of  a  single  jurisdiction across  the  Member 
States,  and  the  Community  as  a  whole  and  in  particular its 
consumers,  will suffer  from  the  absence  of  effective control 
of mergers  of  genuine  Community  dimension. - 27.  -
11,  huwuvur,  their cro:i:.;-lJonler  effect  tut·ns  out  to  be  less 
significant,  a  lowering  of  thresholds  could  lead  to requests 
for  referrals to Member  state authorities,  less  legal 
certainty for  firms,  and  as  a  result  a  general deterioration 
in the constructive relationships  which  the  Commission  has 
built up  with  national authorities  and  with the  business 
community.  The  balance  of  risks  must  be  judged carefully.  In 
the  Commission's  view,  the  results  of  its survey  among 
undertakings  tend to suggest  there is more  to lose  by  not 
lowering the thresholds  than  by  leaving  them at their 
present  level. 
At  the  same  time it is clear to the  commission,  from  the 
extensive consultations9  it has  had,  that  a  majority of 
national administrations  and  competition  agencies  feel  there 
is still insufficient evidence  of  significant benefits  from 
threshold reduction  to make  a  proposal  for  reduction.  They 
stress  in  addition  that  a  proposal  to modify  the  Regulation 
at this  stage  could call  into question  the  consensus  and 
commitment  which  has  been  generated  around  the  application 
of  the existing Regulation.  They  point  in  particular to the 
lack of  cases  below  the  thresholds  where  the  commission 
would  have  taken  a  different decision  on  a  merger  to the  one 
taken  by  national control authorities;  as  well  as  to  the 
strengthening since  1989  of  merger  control policies  in  a 
number  of  Member  states. 
They  also  draw attention to the  impact  of  inflation  on  the 
real value  of  the  existing thresholds  (less  15-20~)  and  the 
fact that,  if the  Community  is enlarged,  there will  be  an 
automatic  increase  in their  community  turnover.  Inflation 
and  enlargment  are  not  in the  Commission's  view  of  parti-
cular significance  in  jurisdiction terms.  However  they 
cannot  be  ignored.  The  Commission  is also  conscious  of  the 
fact that while  the  business  community  is  almost  unanimous 
in its support  for  a  reduction  in  the  world  turnover 
threshold of  ECU  5bn,  only  a  small minority  of  business 
iHlsoci<~tinns  ;n:e  so  far  in  fr1vntu- of  rt•dttr:inq  th,,  Community 
tttnHJV<.'t·  thno>:Iholu  of  I':Cll  ;,>')llm  at  thi:;  :>l<i<J<"'. 
In  these circumstances,  the  commission  believes  that it 
would  be  prudent to  gain  further experience  of  the  operation 
of  the existing Regulation  and  of  the  impact  of  national 
merger  control  policies before  making  any  proposal  for 
revision. 
community-wide  merger  control is nevertheless  a  vital 
element  in  the  functioning  of  the  internal market  and  this 
market  is  integrating rapidly.  The  Commission  therefore 
believes it would  be  wrong  to delay  reexamination  of  the 
threshold indefinitely.  It would  consequently  intend to 
reexamine  the  possibility of  making  a  proposal  to council  to 
reduce  thresholds  at the  latest  by  the  end  of  1996. 
9  in  particular multilateral meetings  on  21st  June  and  14th 
July  1993 - 23  -
B.  REFERRALS 
2.  with  respect  to  the  referrals  procedure~ under Article  9, 
the  Commission  believes  in  the  light of  this review that 
there  is  no  case  at this  stage  for  any  specific  change  to 
Article  9  although  this question could  be  reexamined  at the 
same  time  as  any  review  o·f  thresholds. 
since pursuant to Article  22(6)  the  review of Article  22(3) 
to  (5)  is linked to  a  review of  the thresholds,  it is 
furthermore  proposed to keep  the  rules  on  referrals  under 
Article  22  until the  thresholds  have  been  reviewe·d. 
C.  OTHER  IMPROVEMENTS  REQUIRING  A  CHANGE  IN  THE  REGULATION 
3.  Given  that  no  change  is  proposed  at this  stage with  regard 
to the  principal  substantive  issues  of  the  review  (i.e. 
thresholds  and referrals  procedures), ·the  commission 
suggests  that possible  improvements  of  the  current  proce-
dure,  including  introduction of  the concept  of  banking 
income  for  threshold calculation,  which  would  require  an 
amendment  of  the  Merger  Regulation  should also  be  reexamined 
in  the  context  of  any  proposal  for  amendment  that  the 
Commission  may  make,  in  particular  in  relation to thres-
holds,  between  now  and  end  1996. 
D.  IMPROVEMENTS  NOT  REQUIRING  A  CHANGE  IN  THE  REGULATION 
4.  In  the  meantime,  the  commission  is envisaging  improvements 
to the current procedure  under  the  Merger  Regulation  by 
measures  which it can  implement  on  its "own  authority.  In 
this  respect,  one  basic  aim is to  increase the  transparency 
of the  application of  the  Regulation. 
Improving  transparency  appears  in particular  important  with 
regard to commitments  accepted  by  the  commission  in the 
f,irst  Phase.  It could  be  envisaged to accept  commitments  in 
Phase  1  only where  they  are  offered  by  the  parties at such  a 
stage of  the  procedu.re' that it would  be  still possible  for 
conc:erneu  third parties  tu  make  their  views  on  the  proposed 
remedies  known  in  due  time.  Where  the  parties offer  a 
commitment  at  a  stage  which  is too  late  in  this  respect,  the 
parties could either withdraw their original notification 
and  re-notify  a  modified concentration  plan  or  the 
Commission  could initiate proceedings  under  Phase  2. 
On  the  basis  of  these  proposals  the  number  of  cases  in  Phase 
2  could,  however,  increase.  It would  therefore  be  appro-
priate,  for  the  Commission,  together with  the  Advisory 
Committee  on  Concentrations,  to consider  the  possibility of 
an  accelerated procedure  in  the  ~econd phase  in clear-cut 
cases  where  an  adequate  remedy  has  been  proposed  by  the 
parties.  One  possible  solution would  be  to distribute the 
statement  pursuant  to Article  18,  which  contains  the  commit-
ments,  in  a  limited  numbet·  of  languages  and  for  the  Advisory 
Committee  to  agree  to  adopt  some  opinions  in  an  accelerated 
and written procedure.  Under  the  very  best  hypothesis,  a 
final  decision  under Article  8  could  then  be  adopted  in 
cases  which  are  not  disputed within  two  months  after  Phase  2 
proceedings  were  initiated. - Lll  -
As  to commitments  offered  by  the  parties at  a  late  stage  of 
Phase  2,  the  commission  could pursue  a  policy of  refusing 
those  commitments  which  are offered at  a  time  when  a  consul-
tation of  interested third parties is  no  longer possible. 
The  commission  could  bring  about  further  improvements  in 
transparency  and  legal certainty  by  issuing  guidance  state-
ments  on  the  application of  the  Merger  Regulation.  This 
particularly applies  to technical and  legal issues  relating 
to  jurisdiction,  calculation of  turnover  and  the  notion of 
---·-- - - -- ------coiicenfraHan-~-- I:n--t11fs ·  confext~--t:he··c:ammrssi"on'i:i-Notice--o.i"-
concentrative  and  cooperative operations  should  be  modified 
in the  light of the case  law developed  in the  practice to 
date. 
With  regard to  joint ventures  which  are  only of  minor 
economic  importance  a  more  efficient solution could  be 
achieved  by  accepting  reduced notification requirements  for 
joint ventures  having  annual  turnover  or  a  market  share 
below  some  thr:eshold  to  be  defined"by  the  Commission. 
Finally,  the decision-making  procedure could  be  made  more 
transparent if the  opinion of  the  Advisory  Committee·  .. on 
draft decisions  under Article  8  were  to  be  published at the 
same  time  as  the  commission's  final  decision is first 
announced.  similarly,  the  Commission  intends  to explain  in 
its decision  why  it has  departed,  where  applicable,  from  the 
opinion  delivered  by  the  Advisory  Committee. 
E.  PROPOSED  ACTION 
In  conclusion,  the  Commission  invites  the  Council  to  under-
take  the  review  foreseen  in Article  1  paragraph  3  and 
Article  9  of  Regulation  4064/89  at the  latest  by  the  end  of 
1996. 
It  is  also  submitting  this  report  for  information  to  the 
European  Parliament  and  the  t::conomic  and  Social  Committee. ~  .... 
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f\ ANNEX  .3 
Qualitative  assessment  of  prenotifications  and otherwise  known  cases 
not falling  under  the existing thresholds 
The  present  annex:  lists  a  series  of  concentrations  below  the  present 
worldwide  and  community-wide  turnover  thresholds  which  have  been 
discussed in prenotification meetings  between  the  parties concerned  and 
the  Merger  Task  Force  or  have  otherwise  been  brought  to  the  attention 
of  the  Merger  Task  Force  during  the  first  two  and  a  half  years  of  the 
initial stage of  implementation of  Council  Regulation  4064/89. 
This  list is  not,  and  indeed cannot  be  considered  as  being,  exhaustive. 
·rt  intends  only  to  illustrate  cases  of  concentrations  •.,rith  a  clear 
cross-border  effect  having  an  impact  on  markets  in  several  Member 
States. 
It  should  be  seen  as  a  supplement  to  the  results  of  the  survey  and  a 
number  of  the cases  identified below  are  in  fact  included  in  the ·survey 
results. 
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IRELAND 
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GREECE 
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I  ;oooMECU 
> 250 MECU 
2/3 RULE 
THRESHOLDS 
AGGREGATED TURNOVER=- 1000 MECU (7000 M!O FFI 
DE MINIMIS =  2 BILLION FF 
(25% MARKET SHARE) 
AGGREGATED TURNOVER=- 250 MECU (500 MIO DM) 
DE MINIMIS = 50 MIO OM 
(4 MIO DM. IF BUYER> 1000 MIO DM) 
ASSETS ACQUIRED=- 40 MIO ECU (30 MIO UKL) 
(25% MARKET SHARE) 
AGGREGATED TURNOVER  =- 250 MIO ECU  (500 BILLION 
LIT) 
OR TARGET COMPANY=- 25  MIO ECU !50 BILLiON LIT) 
I  AGGREGATED TURNOVER=- 25 MIO ECU (5000 MIO 
ESCUDOS) 
2 COMPANIES EACH OF TIIEM AT LEAST=- 4 MlO ECU (5 
MIO IRL) ASSETS 
OR TURNOVER 10 MIO IRL 
AGGREGATED TURNOVER=- 25 MIO ECU ( 1000 MIO FB) 
AND 20% MARKET SHARE 
I  AGGREGATED TURNOVER=- 75 MIO ECU 
AGGREGATED TURNOVER=-150 MIO ECU 120000 MIO PTA) 
OR 25% MARKET SHARE 
l PARTY  :TURNOVER OR ASSETS=-75MIO ECU ( 100 MIO $) 
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